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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-3896

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES WHITTED
a/k/a MOHAMED
James Whitted,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No.05-cr-00598-2
District Judge: The Honorable Michael M. Baylson

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
December 12, 2008
Before: MCKEE, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 18, 2008)

OPINION

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
A grand jury for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
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Pennsylvania returned an indictment in October of 2006, charging Michael Harris and
James Whitted with, inter alia, conspiring to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. A superceding indictment added charges of aiding and
abetting three other offenses: (1) distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)
and 2; (2) the possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2; and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 2. A jury found Whitted guilty of all four
counts. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
sentenced Whitted, inter alia, to 420 months of imprisonment.
This timely appeal followed.1 To its credit, the Government concedes that there
was an error in sentencing Whitted and requests remand for resentencing. Accordingly,
we will affirm Whitted’s conviction, but will vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing.
Whitted’s counsel filed an appellate brief, challenging both the conviction and the
legality of the sentence.2 With regard to the former, counsel argued that the District Court
erred: (1) in denying the motion to suppress physical evidence; and (2) by denying
Whitted’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the § 924(c) charge. In addition, at
Whitted’s behest, counsel briefed legal issues which Whitted has requested be raised.
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327–28 (3d Cir. 2006).
2

Because we will grant the Government’s motion to remand for resentencing, we
do not address the merits of the legality of Whitted’s sentence.
2

Our Local Appellate Rules permit the filing of a pro se brief by an appellant when his
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). We do not otherwise entertain pro se briefs when a counseled brief
has been filed. Accordingly, we reject counsel’s attempt to present issues raised solely
pro se within the counseled brief.3
According to Whitted, the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress
all physical evidence seized from Whitted’s person, as the officers lacked probable cause
for his warrantless arrest. Contrary to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3),
Whitted did not first raise this issue in the District Court. At the hearing before the
District Court, Whitted argued only that the warrant issued to search the hotel room
lacked probable cause. App. 2544–47. The District Court’s ruling on the motion
considered only the question of probable cause for the search warrant, and concluded that
probable cause existed. Because Rule 12(e) directs that “[a] party waives any Rule
12(b)(3) defense . . . not raised,” and because Whitted did not challenge whether there
was probable cause for his arrest prior to trial, we conclude that the issue is waived.4 See
3

After the briefing in this appeal was completed, Whitted’s counsel filed a motion
to withdraw, alleging that she had both a mandatory and a permissive basis for
withdrawal. We will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and relieve her of her
obligation to represent Whitted on remand.
4

Whitted tacitly acknowledges that the issue was not raised in his appellate brief,
stating: “To the extent that his attorney failed to raise the issue of suppressing the
physical evidence seized as direct result of Mr. Whitted’s arrest, his attorney was
ineffective as counsel as he could have had no reasonable basis for doing so.” We will
not address the merits of this ineffectiveness claim inasmuch as we have explained that
our preference is to address ineffectiveness claims on collateral review, particularly when
the record is insufficient. United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2003)
3

United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 212 (3d Cir. 2005).
The District Court also erred, in Whitted’s view, by denying his Rule 29 motion on
the conviction of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. We “must sustain the
verdict if there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, to uphold the jury’s decision.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16
(1978).
Whitted acknowledged the Government’s reliance on Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946), but asserted that Pinkerton did not apply because it was not
reasonably foreseeable to him that Harris would use the firearm in furtherance of their
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Based on our review of the trial testimony, particularly
that of Harris, we disagree. Harris explained that he had the firearm recovered from the
hotel room because he had purchased cocaine that day. He testified that he regularly
carried the firearm when purchasing cocaine, that Whitted knew that he generally was
armed when they purchased cocaine, and that Whitted usually asked if Harris had his
firearm with him. These facts are sufficient to allow a jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that it was reasonably foreseeable to Whitted that Harris would use the firearm, as
he did on the day of their arrest, in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States
v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 1997). We reject Whitted’s contention that the
District Court erred by denying his Rule 29 motion on the § 924 conviction.

(citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003)).
4

For the above stated reasons, we will affirm Whitted’s conviction, but will vacate
his sentence and will remand for resentencing. In addition, we will grant the motion to
withdraw filed by Whitted’s counsel.
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